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NOTES ON DE ANIMA. 3.5.

Of all the Aristotelian doctrines perhaps the most difficult is that concerning
the Active and Passive Intellects which we find in the short fifth chapter of the third
Interpretations of this chapter have be.en almost as numerous as

book of the De Anima.
interpreters,

and it would be naive to expect at this stage to be definitive.

Neverthe-

less it seems that progress has been delayed in many cases by a too casual approach to
what Aristotle says in the chapter �tself - and this at least admits of some improvement.
The chapter opens with a comparison between the soul and the world of nature.
Just as in the whole of nature, says Aristotle,
which is potentially all things,

and an efficient cause which makes all things,
A

A

distinct elements must exist en te psyche.
A

1

�

perhaps facile of Ross to say that en t

so

Our first problem is the meaning of this

psych

e

"can hardly mean only

It is

'in the case of

2

the soul111,

even if this is in fact correct,

without offering some reason for his

Rather he might have argued from the text of line 22.

of t�e Active Intellect when it is separated
participle

matter

Does it mean "in the case of soul" or 11in each individual soul11?

en te psyche.

decision.

there are two distinct things,

( taken

G

The use of the aorist

with the word ch ristos which, as we shall see,

"separable" in line 17
the Passive.

( ch8ristheis ) .

)

Here Aristotle speaks

must have the sense of

implies a time when the Active Intellect is not separate from

There must therefore be a time when the Active and Passive Intellects are

united in some wa;y.

That Theophrastus assumed the existence of such a time is shown by-

3

.A

8

his remark Mikton gar p s ho nous ek te tou poietikou kai tou dynamei.
Active Intellect is at some time at least not separated from the Passive,

Now if the
it is clear

that it cannot be -wholly transcendent.
May we say, however,
transcendent,

it is to be regarded as a single Intellect immanent in a number of human

souls during their lifetime?
an effect on matter
that it is Art

that although the Active Intellect is not entirely

( with

Aristotelian view.

( hoion

Aristotle compares the Active Intellect to art which has

pros ten
he
hylen
"" techne
;._
/\
I\ pepontren.
) Must we assume from this

a capital

A)

which affects matter?

As we know from the Metaphysics
/

Of course this is not the

( 1071A20

)

- 22 ,

Man is the father

'' ,: ''.'_)

- 2 of Man, but there is no such existent as Man.
father of Achilles.

Rather we should say that Peleus is the

Similarly Art is not the efficient cause of the sculpting of a
The cause is rather the particular form of

block of marble into the form of a statue.

the statue in the mind of the sculptor who is the efficient cause of the product.

Thus

if we are to put any weight at all upon Aristotle's comparison of the Active and PasE-1ive
Intellects to Art and its material,

we must say that it is not Active Intellect, but a

particular Active Intellect, that is the element in the soul which nmakes all things",
just as it is the particular art of the particular sculptor which causes the production
of the statue.
soul11•

Aristotle then means by his phrase en t� psyc� "inside the individual

Every soul therefore contains its own individual Active and Passive Intellect.

The interpretations of this passage which spring from the minds of Alexander of
Aphrodisias and Averroes must be rejected.
Our interpretation, however,
Theophrastus

(�.

Them.

4

is apparently in accordance with that of

in de Anima 108.

25 - 28 Heinze), who, after wondering whether

the Active Intellect is symphytos or whether it has a genesis, decides in favour of the
former alternative (eoike d1oun hds agen ci tos).
imm.3.nent (enyparchbn).
describe it.

The Active Intellect is agenetos and

We should note also the language which Theophrastus employs to

It is ho kin'?m as well as ho poi� tikos - and the genuinely Aristotelian

nature of this terminology has been demonstrated by Barbotin.

5

The fact that the Active

Intellect is a "moving" cause brings it into line with Aristotle's general theories of
movement and activity, as we shall see below.
There is no need at this stage of the discussion to invoke the famous text of
the De Generatione Animalium about the �-s thyrathen,
have done.
6

as so many of the commentators

This mistake derives from Alexander and still recurc? frequently.

Philip, for example,

writes:

J. A.

"The phrase ho thyrathen nous serves as a hint or aid to

the understanding of what Aristotle meant by the nous poietikos.11

7

Barbotin, however,

rightly connects Aristotle' s leipetai de ton nou�__!££�o n thyrathen epei si.enai with a
passage of Theophrastus quoted by Simplicius.

The passage runs hai men orexeis kai

�ithymiai kai orgai somatik ai kineseis eisi kai apo toutou ten archen echousin, hosai de
A

A

A

- 3 kriseis kai thebriai, tautas ouk estin eis heteron anagagein,
(this too seems

an

all'

"'

en aute te psyche
/\

A

echo of De Anima 3.5) kai he arche kai h� energeia kai to telos, ei ge
�

de kai ho nous kreitton te kai theioteron, hate de exothen epeision kai panteleios.
this is an echo of the doctrine of the De Generatione Animalium,
itself,

That

if not of the treatise

seems certain, but there is no reason to claim that it refers to the Active

Intellect.

Both the De Generatione Animalium and Theophrastus refer to nous as a whole;

to both the distinction between Active a.nd Passive Intellect is irrelevant.

There will

therefore be no further discussion here of the nous thyrathen.
We may say then that there are within each individual soul an Active and a
Passive Intellect.
that is moved.

The Active Intellect is the moving factor and the Passive the factor

We may perhaps compare the doctrine of the Physics that all souls,

indeed everything in motion, require an efficient as well as a material cause.
everything that is in motion must be moved by something,

and

11If then

and that something must either

be moved in its turn by something else or not, and in the latter case it is the true
agent and we need go no further, but in the other case we must run it back until we do
reach a primary mover not moved by- something else

•

•

•

then it follows that if everything

that is in motion is moved by some agent, and if the primary agent itself is in motion but
is not moved by anything else, it must be moved by itself (256Al4 - 22).11

Aristotle then

of course goes on to demonstrate that the first mover is not in fact self-moved but unmoved, but this does not concern us here.

We are simply concerned to recognize that the

individual �' not being an unmoved mover,
efficient cause.

Furthermore,

must itself be moved in some such way by an

as we know, the efficient cause is present in the nous

itself; it is in fact the Active Intellect.
II
After determining that the Active Intellect is present in the soul, we must next
consider the nature of its activity.
things".

Aristotle tells us that it functions 11by making all

We must therefore unravel the meaning of this phrase.

In his book on Aristotle,

Ross held that the function of the Active Intellect is to bring the Passive Intellect up
from potentiality to actuality by making it actually know its objects.

·

So far so good,

- 4

··· ··

8

but he then supposes that for this to be possible,
in us that actually knows already,

the Active Intellect must be

"something

some element that is cut off from our ordinary con-

sciousness so that we are not aware of (its) pre-existing knowledge11•

This

suggestion

about the pre-existing knowledge of the Active Intellect will require further investigation later.
the De Anima.

Ross, however, himself offers a different view in his recent Commentary on

.

9

Here he suggests that the Active Intellect is the faculty by which we

form general conceptions
infer a third.

(2)

grasp universal truths,

and (3) from two universal truths

10

As Philip

has pointed out,

this view is different from any of the

interpretations of the Active Intellect offered by the commentators.
goes on to show,

(1)

it does considerable violence to the De Anima itself.

furthermore,

as

he

Yet Ross himself

has indicated (p.45) that there are two suggestions in De Anima 3.5 itself which show how
Aristotle must have understood the Active Intellect:

the first is the comparison with

art which does not make it products out of nothing; the second is that with light which
raises potential colours to the status of actual colours.

We know in general that

Aristotle believes that nothing can be created out of nothing.

We can be certain there

fore that t8i poiein panta cannot simply mean 11by making all things".

It must mean "by

11
making things of one kind into things of another".
work upon some

"material" and must transform this

know that it is in the s oul.

What else,

That is,
11material11•

we may ask,

the Active Intellect must
What is this material?

We

than the Passive Intellect?

Although Ross points to the help the comparisons of the Active Intellect with
art and with light can give,

he is now unwilling to make use of them.

of the function of the Active Intellect in mind,

we

With his account

Ehould not now be s urprised at his

denying (p.43) that the Active Intellect acts on the Passive Intellect at all; rather,
thinks,

it is concerned with the ap prehension of a different class of objects.

theory is supported by a curious argument.

Aristotle says,

according to Ross,

he

This
"not that

the one Reason acts on the other, but that the one makes all things (although on Ross's
interpretation it could in fact only make a limited number of "logical" or "mathematical"
things) and the other becomes all things.

This is certainly what Aristotle says,

real point is that all things are 11made11 in the soul.·

but the

All the objects of thought are

- 5 11made11 into characteristics of the Passive Intellect which thus "is made" or "becomes" al.1
things.

Thus when one thought gives way to the next,

one kind of thought,

is made into another.

fact "become all things11.

now "made" of

This is the only way in which it could in

In rejecting such an interpretation, Ross is simply despising

what little help Aristotle himself gives us.
statement

the Passive Intellect,

12

He is in fact exaggerating his earlier

that "the analogy with light must not be pressed too closely".

Rather it seems

that neither this analogy nor the comparison with art should be used at all!
Ross's recent interpretation of the Active Intellect must therefore be denied
on the grounds that it flies in the face of what little evidence we have.

We must revert

to something like the view that he adopted in his Aristotle and recognize,

with the

De Anima itself, that the Active Intellect has the function of bringing potential
knowledge in the Passive Intellect into actuality,

just as light turns potential colours
Active

into actual colours and art transforms the block of marble into the statue.
Intellect transforms the nous poi � tikos into a nous noon.

'rhus far at least the inter-

pretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias must be pronounced correct.
The Active Intellect,

we see, is an efficient cause which acts upon the Passive

Intellect in the act of thinking.

Since efficient causes are themselves in act,

read in the Metaphysics (1049B24) as well as in the De Anima itself (417Al7
must consider the nature of the activity of the Active Intellect.
Intellect is the efficient cause of thought,
act,

is the father of Achilles,

-

18),

we

Since the Active

are we to suppose that as Peleus,

so the Active Intellect,

as we

a man in

if it is to cause th ought, must

itself have thought:
We should realize from the start that the comparison of the Intellects 11vd.th
Peleus and Achilles must be misleading.

Peleus is external to Achilles, but the Active

I\

Intellect and the nous noon are both in the soul.
soul is not comparable to Peleus,
Peleus to Achilles himself.

The efficient cause of thought in the

but to that inherited power of development handed on by

After Achilles is born, his efficient cause is in himself.

We may in a sense say that it is in act, since it is effective, but the immanent efficient
cause in Achilles is not in actuality a man.

No more need the Active Intellect be

- 6

-·

possessed of any knowledge of the external world - for if it were,

it would be identical

with its objects and thus also path e tikos - nor need it have any such pre-existing knowledge of which we ourselves are unaware,

as Ross suggests.

The e fficient cause in

Achilles is not a man in actuality, but a power that is capable of making Achilles,
boy,

now

a

Similarly there is no need for the Active Intellect to be possessed of

into a man.

actual knowledge,

at any rate of the external world;

rather it is the power which enables

such knowledge to be abstracted by the Passive Intellect.
This rather strange nature of the Active Intellect explains very well the
apparent confusion of terminology which Aristotle uses to describe it.
as we shall see,
apt.

why the comparison of the Active Intellect wit h light is so peculiarly

In line 15,

an energeia.

It also explain s ,

the Active Intellect is described as hexis tis,

Commentators have found this puzzling.

Hicks,

while in line 18 it is

after noting that in a

13
number of passages hexis is practically a synonym for eidos,

writes:

11That which is

always actual and never potential can only be described as a hexis by a stretch of the
term.

Hence tis.11

But the Active Intellect is an unusual kind of energeia in any case.

Again it seems comparable to the power to stimulate g r owth inherent in Achilles.
power might reasonably be called a kind of
an actuality.
of disposition.
soul,

Peleus,

of course,

11

positiv e quality"

( the

This

phrase is Hicks'

could only be described as an actuality ,

)

or

not as a kind

Hexis is thus also particularly appropriate to an efficient cause in the

rather than external to it.

Most interesting still is the fact that light itself,

to which the Active Intellect is compared, is one of the activities which can at times be
called a hexis.

At De Anima 3.5.15 it is given as an example of a hexis,

acts as an efficient cause and we would suppose it to be an activity.
this is almost always what it is.
diaphanous.

Yet at

418Bl9

At De Anima

�.18B9

Indeed elsewhere

and 419All it is an energeia tou

it is by implication a hexis.

Aristotle's terminology of ,·,potentiality",

yet below it

11actuality",

The truth of the matter is that
"disposition",

is sometimes

insufficiently precise to achieve an exact description of the phenomena with which he is
concerned.
It is well kno-wn that Alexander of Aphrodisias'

attitude towards this

-

(

-

mysterious hex.is is very strange and cannot be acceptable as an interpretation of
Aristotle.

Alexander's view is that the Active Intellect is the cause of the Passive
It has been suggested that the only reasonable

Intellect's becoming a nous en hexei.

/\

explanation of this is that when he says einai tina dei kai poietikon noun,
t� s hexe� s t � s tou hylikou nou ginetai,
our own,

for in De Anima

3.5

hos aitios

14
he is reading a text of Aristotle different from

as we have it we must certainly follow the general opinion

of modern scholars that the Active Intellect is not the cause of some kind of hexis but
that it is such a hex.is itself.

Mr.

F. H. Sandbach, however, has suggested to me an

explanation which accounts for the difficulty of Alexander's interpretation very well,
namely that he understood h � s hexis tis
did not intend this sense,

be understood,

in line 15.

It is certain that Aristotle

but had he done so I do not believe that it would have been

impossible for him to omit the
him of being perverse,

(j)

5.

If Alexander took him this way,

but not of being a fool,

for if such

a

we can indeed accuse

reading of Aristotle could

the Alexandrist doctrine would readily follow.

Now that

we

see what kind of hexis - energeia the Active Intellect is,

we

should realize that there is no need to suppose that it has some kind of pre-existing
knowledge of the external world of whose existence we are unaware.
in Achilles is not identical with Achilles the man,
of Achilles the man;
call it poi � tikon.

nor is it any kind of potentiality

rather it is the power which produces Achilles the man.

\rfo might

Sirrdlarly light is not identical with the colours which it produces,

nor is it any kind of

11pre-colour11 in the ordinary sense of 11colour";

shall see, the colour of the transparent,
colours.

'rhe power of grol.Arth

rather it is,

as

we

which must make it different from ordinary

Similarly the Active Intellect does not possess ordinary knowledge

( and

thus is

not any thought which is formally identical with the external. object of thought ) either in
a form of which we are conscious or in any other form;

rather it is the power which

/\

enables the Passive Intellect to become a nous noon by being made identical with the
intelligible Forms of the objects of thought.
We can perhaps understand this power a little better by pushing the comparison
with light

( as

light is understood by Aristotle ) a little further.

Light is not one of

but it is in a sense analogous

the colours it brings up from potentiality to actuality,

to pho s hoion chr8 ma esti tou diaphanous (De Anima

to them.

It is

418Bll).

Similarly perhaps the Active Intellect will not have knowledge, pre-existing

otherwise,

a

colour sui generis;

or

of the same kind as that which it helps to produce in the Passive Intellect,

but another knowledge of a unique kind, which could therefore only be knowledge of itself,
since all other knowledge could potentially be obtainable by the Passive Intellect.

But

we shall return to this later.
III
/\

/'\

In line 17 Aristotle describes the Active Intellect as choristos kai apathes
�

A

kai amiges; in line 22 he speaks of a time when it is choristheis.
Hicks remarks that 11ch 8 ristos means here not merely 'separable'
i.e.

'not involved in physical life'."

Following Zeller,

but 'actually separate'

He thinks it is best explained by De Generatione

Animalium 736B28 where bodily activities are said to have nothing to do with the activity
/I

of� (cf. De An. 408B29, 413A4 - 8), and remarks that "the three predicates choristos,
!\
I\
apath es, arruges were applied to� in III c, 4 before any mention had been made of the
•

distinction between active and passive intellect".

He believes that in chapter four

these epithets are applied primarily to the Passive Intellect and that they must now be
applied a fortiori to the Active.

And,

.A

he holds, in chapter four choristos means
•

"actually separate 11•
Let us first look at whether we can derive much help for chapter five from
chapter four.

In chapter four there is no doubt that Aristotle is teaching that �

must be wholly free from association with the body.
( e,g.429Al8, 24- 25).
429All,

/\

That is the sense he gives to anuges

j'..

Choristos too then must, as Hicks says, mean

separate, that is,

from the body-soul complex.

our ch� ristos in chapter five line seventeen?

''actually separate" at

But what relevance has this for

Is Aristotle there speaking of the

relation of nous in general or even of the Passive Intellect to the body?
As a preliminary to the solution of this problem,
I\

with the choristheis of line 22.

we must compare ch� ristos

Most recent writers on this chapter of the De Anima

have assumed that the "WOrds ch�ristheis d 1 esti monon touth' hoper esti (11.

22 - 23)
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For Aristotle to be able to say "having been separated" implies that he supposes there is
a time when the Active Intellect is not 11separated11•

That he thinks of the separation as

taking place at death is shown by the irnrnediate raising of the question of immortality.
Since then there is a time when the Active Intellect is not separated but linked in some
way to the Passive, as efficient cause to matter, and since,

however,

separation does

then during a man's lifetime his Active Intellect must not be separated

occur at death,
but separable.

IV

In h is edition of the De Anima Ross brackets out to d'auto

21
(1.22);

in his German translation Theiler

that since these w ords
Sandbach reminded me,

( as

22 - 25.

itself.

/\

•

•

•

oude chronoi.

noei

Ross suggests

far as oude chron8 i ) recur in chapter seven - where,

as Hr.

/\

they are also preceded by hyles - and are more appropriate there,

they should be excised here.
with

omits to d'auto

(1.19) •.• ou

He adds that they disturb the continuity of lines 17

-·

19

The latter argument is subjective and could not be accepted as adequate by

As we shall see, the words all' ouk hote men noei hote d'ou noei deleted by Ross

but retained by Theiler are necessary for an understanding of the last phrase of the
chapter.

And even if this were not so,

it would seem that Theiler is the more moderate

in retaining these words which do not occur again in chapter seven,
/\

the passage from to d'auto to oude chronoi.

while still deleting

Assuming therefore that there is no

satisfactory reason for deleting as much as Ross desires,

let us consider the validity of

the decision to remove simply the passage that is repeated in chapter seven.
There would seem to be a clear case for deletion only if these words upset the
sense of chapter five.

Let us consider the idea that in the individual potential kno��

ledge is prior to actual knowledge, though in general this is not so.

How does this idea

square with the follo'Wing suggestion that the Active Intellect always noei?

Now we know

already that the Active Intellect is in the soul of the individual and is distinct in

22
each individual.
Since this is so,

We know too that it is in act and that it is a hexis tis,

like l ight.

the potential knowledge that is prior in the individual cannot be the
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knowledge of itself,

]J

· -·

if it is continually conscious of itself and intuits itself in an

eternal present w ithout memory of the past or imagination of the future.

Thus the Active

Intellect which thinks continually and cannot kno w the external world must be thinking

( if

we can call it "thinking11 - perhaps

itself.

"being conscious" would be a better phrase ) o.f
I\

/\

/\

In this respect it is comparable with God who is noesis n oeseos in the

27
Ivietaphysics

(1074B33).

Scarcely anyone nowadays is disposed to take seriously the

identification of the Active Intellect with God made by Alexander of Aphrodisias�
can at least learn to see how such an identification might have seemed plausible.

but we
We

have demonstrated here certain features of the Active Intellect akin to those of God,
although to move from similarity to identity would be rash,

but

yet at lea.st a recognition

that the highest aspect of the human mind can have no knowledge of the external world may
help us to understand why the God of the Metaphysics a fortiori cannot have
ledge.

This God is said to be very good

(1072B30)

and to think what is best

Clearly the best must be more akin to the Active than to the

such know-

(1074B33).

Passive Intellect of man,

and clearly the thought of God must be more akin to the thought of that Active Intellect.
Thus if the Active Intellect has no memory and no knowledge of the external world,

we

should not be surprised that Aristotle refuses to attribute such memory and knowledge to
God.

Perhaps we may sa3r that Aristotl e envisages b ot h God and the Active Intellect as

the power of thought understood as thought of itself.

VI
Yet in this discussion of the nature of the Active Intellect by itself is not a
fundamental difficulty being neglected?

vJe. have seen already that the Active Intellect

is during our lifetime 11in the soul11 and that it acts as a necessary efficient cause of
thought.

Yet since the soul is a unity an.ct exists as a unity,

that some part of it

( i.e.

the Active Intellect ) can exist separately after death?

human soul for Aristotle is the form of the human body;
apart except in the minds of philosophers, that is,
is an abstraction,

how can Aristotl e hold

how can a mere part of that soul,

The

form and matter cannot exist

as abstractions.

If soul by itself

the Active Inte,llect,

be anything

-- l/: ...
more than an abstraction?

28

abstraction.

Yet clearly for Aristotle it is much more than an

There is no easy solution to this problem.

All we can do here is indicate

that this difficulty about the Active Intellect is merely an extreme example of

a

.

The problem has been explained in the

difficulty about the Aristotelian fonn in general.

29
clearest possible terras by Gilson.

Gilson

imagines Plato living long enough to read the

first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics and then writing a dialogue entitled Aristoteles
to refute the novelties of his pupil.
"Then,

my lad,

an essence,

I wish you could tell me how it may be that beings are,

( individuals )

in the Metaphysics.

as the only realities,

he also identifies ousia with

essence

Essence is the cause of the existence of individuals, but essence by

itself does not exist.

And yet sometimes it does seem to exist apart - at least in the

But not only in the case of God does this difficulty arise.

that the Active Int ellects, identical but distinct in individual
confusion.

through sharing in

The difficulty is simply that while Aristotle usually

which itself is not."

regards synola

case of God.

In this supposed dialogue Socrates is made to sayj

The soul is the form of the body; the Active

men,

We can

now

::3ee

exhibit the same

Intellect is in the soul during

our mortal life; the form cannot exist with out the matter.
If any real consistency is to be preserved for the doctrine of the De Anima,,

we

30
cannot but follow the advice of Philip,

who remarks:

111 can see no grounds for ref1rning

to concede that in stud;}ring and describing the human soul Aristotle recognized in it some
faculty or capacity or element not explainable as part of the bod;y-soul complex

•

.

.

It

11

is certainly true that in De Ahima J.5 the Active Intellect does not seem to be explainable as part of such a complex;

yet we must not forget that in general Aristotle holds

that it is by the possession of the power of reason that man is differentiated from the
animals.

And he is not merely thinking of the possession of such a power,

but of its use;

31
that is,

he regards nous noon

as

an essential aspect of the form of

man.

We are bac.k

again to the problem of whether and in what way form in general can exist apart.

The

De Anima merely exhibits in an extreme manner the difficulties in the whole Aristotelian
doctrine of the reality or unreality of essence.
know from 412B 10 - 11,

I\

The soul is not only a form,

an ousia he kata ton logon.

/\

but,

as
I\

we

touto de to ti en einai toi. toioidi

- 15 /\

somati.

In view of this, it seems no easier to understand how the human mind,

and

a fortiori the Active Intellect, is not a part of the body-soul complex than it is to
believe that there can be wholly immaterial substances.

And yet for Aristotle there is

at least one such substance.
VII
We must turn to the last phrase of the chapter,

where the text reads kai aneu

32
toutou outhen noei.
capable of

a

Of this Ross 1-'JTote as follows:

variety of interpretations,

"The last words of the chapter

are

viz.

(1)

'and '\i\iithout the passive reason the active reason knows nothing.'

(2)

'and without the active reason the passive rea.son knows nothing. '

(3)

'and without the passive reason nothing knows. 1

(4)

'and without the active reason nothing knows.

I II

Without offering any reason for his choice, Ross then approved of number

(4).

It is clear that the problem in this sentence is the reference of toutou.
Considerations of grammar do not seem adequate to settle the matter one way or the other;
considerations of doctrine must therefore be invoked.

Now we should naturally suppose

that if nothing rtthinks11 without the Passive Intellect,

then the Active Intellect cannot

think when it is separated from that Passive Intellect.

And yet unless we unreasonably

excise the phrase auk hate men noei hote d1ou noei in line 22,
Intellect does not merely think intermittently.
that aneu t.outou means

w'e

know that the Active

Hence it would seem absurd to suppo�:;e

"without the Passive Intellect".

Zeller,

33

however,

who is

34
followed on this point by Rodier,
by Hicks,

35

and whose argument in itself is accepted as reasonable

denies the contradiction.

His argument is that the phrase ouk hote men noei

hote d'ou noei does not apply to the thought of the individual,
thought that is under discussion in aneu toutou·outhen noei.

whereas it is such

Zeller's contention that

the earlier passage does not deal with individuals depends on a comparison of these words
with the section to d1auto

I\

•

•

•

oude chr onoi immediately preceding them.

Of course if this

section is to be deleted (as is the view of Ross and Theiler) half our difficulties are

- 16 solved,

but the case for deletion is,

neglect Zeller rs argument.

Assuming then that we accept the full text,

that Zeller's suggestion is valid?
is prior to potential,
hote

•

•

•

insufficiently strong for us to

as we have seen,

are we to agree
/\

/',

Are we to say that since in general actual episteme

but that this is not so in the individual,

ouk

the words all'

with their suggestion that the Active Intellect must qua active be in

noei,

continuous thought,

cannot apply to the Active Intellect in any individual soul,

but must

refer to the Active Intellect in general?
We are in no way bound to accept such reasoning.

In the first place we must

consider the Active Intellects VJithin each individual soul.
be merely potential.
Intellect?

What in that case would bring t hem up to actuality?

Such a regress is impossible.

are in fact already t� ousiai.
to d 'auto..

They cannot, as we hav e

on

The Passive Intellect?

energeia.

Another Active

They

That is absurd.

It should thus be clear that the words

/\

•

We cannot

oude chronoi are not to be taken in the manner favoured by Zeller.

� �

deduce from them that the Active Intellect in the individual has potential epist m
it has actual.

�

term epist m � should indicate that the words to d'auto

Episteme,

Besides,

Suc h a situation turns out to be absurd.

Active Intellect at all,

seen,

.

•

•

the very use of the

oude chron8 i do no t

and should not therefore be used as

a

before

guide to all'

concern

ouk.

.

the

, noei.

as we know well from the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere is

not th e same as � ·

The truth of the matter may b e - and this is perhaps the best

reason for retaining the words to d'auto
/\

/\

/\

.

•

.

oude chronoi - that while in the individual

pot ent ial episteme is prior in time to actual,

the Active Intellect on the c ontrary does
/\

not experience the movement from potential to actual �s i s but r ather is continually in
act.

Thus Aristotle by the whole passage to d1auto

.

uniqueness of the operation of the Active Intellect.
·

•

.

ou noe i is further emphasizing the
This being so,

Zeller's attempt to

persuade us that aneu toutou can refer to the Passive Intellect without Aristotle 1 s
contradicting what he has just said must be accounted. a failure.

We are bound therefore

to translate aneu toutou as "without the Active Intellect".
Thus of Ross's four alternatives as translations for the last phrase of De Anima

3.5

we can eliminate two.

The words must either mean "and vtlthout the Active Intellect
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«e²}Î ²UºÎ «Î U^³ÀfÎ ^vÎ *%/91Î   
«Î ²¾²Î UU}¾«Î ³Î «e«U³8Î

QeÎ ¥¾e«³Î «6Î

ÂÎ vU¦Î Î ²¯Î ¦e« e^³Î

Qe¦eÎ «Î Î wU^³Î UÎ }¦eU²Î bwve¦e^e Î

Te¦eU«Î Î ³eÎ

^U«eÎ vÎ «e«U²Î ³Î «Î ³eÎ \e^²«Î «e«ebÎ Å^Î Z^³Î ¾ Î ²eÎ «e«e¦}U Î UbÎ ³¾«Î ³tÎ
¦}UÎ «Î Uvve^²ebÎ \ÌÎ «e²}Î eÇ»e¦UÎ +%/A&$ Î Î ³eÎ ^U«eÎ wÎ ²¾}³ Î ³[³Î «Î ³eÎ
}¦X° Î vÎ ¾Àe¦«U«Î 9U!Î O«³Î 21@)/

Î ³eÎ «²¾U³Î «Î


§ÀbebÎ ²Î \ÈÎ ²eÎ \e^³«Î

xÎ ³¾}³Î Â^Î U¦eÎ Âe¦eÎ ^UebÎ

\¼²Î 

³eÎ

««e««Î vÎ ¦}U«Î awÎ *&49'.Î  &/ "Î

¦^e««Î vÎ ²¾}²Î be«Î ²Î be ebÎ Î ³eÎ

³eÎ 9^³ÀeÎ H³ee^³Î

R«Î ±Î ÂÈÎ

GÎ «¼Î ²eÎ ÂeÎ UÈÎ «UÈÎ ²U²Î Î ²eÎ bÀb¼UÎ «¼Î ³Í¦eÎ «Î UÎ ?^²ÀeÎ UbÎ UÎ
LU««ÀeÎ G²ee^³#Î

SeÎ evve^³Î vÎ ²eÎ v¦e¦Î «Î »Î \¦}Î ²eÎ U³³e¦Î ¾ Î v¦Î

²u^ÈÎ ²Î

,

- 18 act.

It is itself in a rather peculiar kind of act.

limited to the Active Intellect,

As for immortality,

which certainly survives,

no knowledge of the external world.

this is

though it has no memory and

Its strange character may perhaps best be

summarized as a power to induce thought which is itself some kind of self-thinking
being.

If this much is clear about the nature and function of the Active Intellect,

the nature and function of the Passive Intellect becomes easier to understand.

John Ivi.

Rist

University College,

Toronto.
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¡tcµ NXu§cµ J¡c~~c^¡µ



Jnµ ?u¡¡}cµ c¤uc_µ Xµ ¬_µ ¬tu^sµ ¬¤~_µ ¡µ X¡¤X~~°µ sW§cµ Xµ ¡c X~µ cc µ tcµ
^¤~_µ tX§cµ Xu_µ {c^t7v cµ ^oµ /+$C~8µ
Fcu¡cµ tuµ ^¡u¤X~µ ¡X~X¡vµ nµ ^ v¡µ Xµ cXX¡c µ Q~cvµ dcµ ¡cµ /µ




$,*µ ccµ ¡µ tX§cµ  cµ v_cXµ oµ ¡tcµ _u¡v^¡vµ ]c¡«ccµ ^sv¡µ X`µ ^sv¡tcvµ


''!µ vµ _c¨cµ u¡caccµ vµ ^tv¡µ wµ v^~puX µ ^ cµ v_vc_c²Xµ

¬tcµ tcµ ¬v¡c=µ

_uµ _uu¡¡µ cµ u]uu¡ _vµ cXX²ucµ cµ ^µ dXX³vcµ _vµ oX¡¡µ c~µ ccvc´Xµ
¨u¤¡Yµ bcµ ¤µ
$<µ

Uµ  Pµ ccµ ¡cµ < µ /9µ

*#µ

Pµ  Iu^{µ ccµ ¡cµ $$µ

*$µ

Uµ Stcu~cµ

**µ

Hµ





µ ?µ **µ

T]cµ _ucµ Rcc~cµ Dc~vµ $<1<µ 2<µ

czc^¡uµ oµ ¡tcµ §vc¬µ ¡sX¡µ X~~µ ¤|µ t¡cµ









cvµ cncµ ¡µ ¡µ cX^sµ X¡v^¥~Xµ

?^¡u¨cµ K¡c~c^¡ µ ]¤¡µ ¡µ ¡tcµ @^¡x¨cµ K¡c~c^¡µ uµ qecX~ µ ccµ ]c~«µ
*-µ

Pµ Gµ Iu^{µ ccµ ¡cµ

 

µ ?µ *0µ c®~Xvµ ¬t°µ ?u¡¡~c µ ¬sµ _cµ ¡µ Xq¥fµ

¡tcµ oX^¡µ scc µ s~_µ ¡tX¡µ ¡scµ NXv¨cµ L¡c~~c^¢µ vµ cvtX]~cµ

Stcµ OXv¨cµ

K¡c~~c^¡µ tXµ  cµ ¡c¡vX~v¡°µ nµ ¤]¡X^cµ uµ v¡ µ X_µ ¡tvqµ nµ ¡tvµ |v_µ ^Xµ
c_¤gµ Mc¡µ
*/µ

 



Stcµ ¤^¡¤X¡uµ ¤µ c c¤ cµ _cµ t¡vµ qvªxrµ ¡ scµ ccµ ''Ucµ _µ ¡µ vµ ~vohµ
c c ]cµ ¡tX¡µ ¡tcµ A^¡v¨cµ K¡c~~c^¡µ vµ c¡dZµ vµ u v]cµ v^cµ ¬cµ ^¤~_µ ¡µ
()c c ]c%&µ uµ ~uocµ Xµ oX^¡µ «sv^tµ ¬cµ c¨cµ |c«µ

Stcµ cc®v¡vqµ A^¡v¨cµ K¡i~~c^¡ µ

u^cµ u£µ uµ uXv©c µ ]¨v¤±µ ^¤~_µ ¡µ ]jµ c^c¡v©cµ oµ oX^¡µ
*2µ

Pµ Fµ Iu^|µ ccµ ¡cµ $$µ 3!5 µ µ Aµ 

*4µ

V°µ _cµ ?u¡¡cµ ¬u¡cµ

X¡scµ ¡tXµ d c¥cvµ Xµ vµ /!:C*6>µ

\¡µ /";E*6µ onµ tcµ tXµ X~cX_°µ c X|c_µ ¡sX¡µ

Dc^X¦kµ

c °µ uµ Xµ Xonc^¡uµ oµ ¡sX¡µ ¬tu^tµ

t_µ ¡tcµ y_µ X¡slµ ¡tXµ ¡tcµ

v_µ v¡c~o µ X_µ ¡tccncµ v¡µ uµ ^~cXµ ¡tX¡µ X¡µ ¡tmµ

_cX¡tµ oµ ¡tcµ ]_°µ

B¡µ /.#A*-µ  */µ t«c§cµ scµ tXµ ¡µ c^uou^X~~°µ

\u_µ ¡tX¡µ

c °µ ^c[c µ

c °µ uµ Xµ X^¡v©v¡°µ nµ ¡tcµ ^ ~c¯ µ X_µ ¡tccncµ ]°µ v¡vqµ

 _µ

c c ]c µ tcµ c tXu²cµ ¡sX¡µ ¬scµ ¡scµ OXv¨cµ K¡c~~c^¡µ cu tcµ X_µ ¡tcµ



¡µ
vµ

- 3 thus destroyed), then memory perishes with us.
I am tempted to suppose that the words 11We do not remember",

followed by 11this

(the

Active Intellect) is impassive" contributed to Alexander's positing a common Active
Intellect for all of us.

27.

A similar comparison is made by Mansion (see note 16) 470,

who however compares

not the Active Intellect but the "pure essence of Intellect".

28.

Although in this paper

we

are discussing the p roblem of the Active Intellect only,

it should be observed that � as a whole is held by Aristotle in a number of
passages (apart from De.
in its own. right.
at De An.

An.

ff.

I\

it is choristos) to be some sort of entity

It "seems" to be an ousia in its own right and to be imperishable
At 413A6 - 7 there are some parts of the soul �mich are not

408Bl9 - 20.

entelechies of the body.

744B21

3.4 where

Nous comes from outside at De Gen Anim.

736B27 ff. and

The possibility of its survival occurs again at Met. 1070A24.

I t goes

without saying that all this is difficult to square with the perishability of the
Passive Intellect in De Anima 3.5.

29.

E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto 1952) 49

JO.

J. Philip (see note 6) 201.

31.

Cf. A.

32.

W. D. Ross (see note 1) 152.

33.

E. Zel�er, Aristotle II (Eng trans., London 1897) 101, note

-

50.

Mansion (see note 16) 466.

/

3.

34.

G. Rodier,

35.

R.

D.

Hicks (see note 1 1 ) 509.

36.

R.

D.

Hicks (see note
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